

ATTENTION: PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE MEMBERS WILL RECEIVE A UNIQUE PANELIST LINK BY EMAIL. PLEASE USE THIS LINK TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS MEETING.



PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE MEETING AGENDA

MONDAY, SEPTEMBER 12, 2022
9:00 a.m.

Pursuant to Assembly Bill 361 and the findings made by CVAG, this meeting will only be conducted via video/teleconferencing.

INSTRUCTIONS FOR PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

Members of the public may use the following link:

<https://us02web.zoom.us/j/87463016891?pwd=WXh2TUI6NkNsS2I4UjFHTDF6UkRBQT09>
Password: 516088

One Tap Mobile: +16699009128,,87463016891#

Dial In: +1 669 900 9128

Webinar ID: 874 6301 6891

Password: 516088

***This will provide listening access and ability to address the
Public Safety Committee when called upon.***

IF YOU ARE UNABLE TO CONNECT VIA DIAL IN OPTION, PLEASE CALL 760-346-1127.

Public comment is encouraged to be emailed to the Public Safety Committee meeting prior to the meeting at cvag@cvag.org by 5:00 p.m. on the day prior to the committee meeting. Comments intended to be read aloud should be no more than 300 characters.

**THIS MEETING IS HANDICAPPED ACCESSIBLE.
ACTION MAY RESULT ON ANY ITEMS ON THIS AGENDA.**

**UNLESS OTHERWISE STATED, ALL ACTION ITEMS WILL BE PRESENTED TO THE
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE FOR FINAL APPROVAL.**

1. **CALL TO ORDER** – Chair Waymond Fermon, Mayor, City of Indio

2. **ROLL CALL**

A. **Member Roster**

P4

3. **PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE**

A. **Moment of Silence**

4. **PUBLIC COMMENTS ON AGENDA ITEMS**

This is the time and place for members of the public to address the Public Safety Committee on agenda items. At the discretion of the Chair, comments may be taken at the time items are presented. Please limit comments to three (3) minutes.

5. **CHAIR /COMMITTEE MEMBER/CVAG STAFF COMMENTS**

6. **EX-OFFICIO UPDATES**

7. **CONSENT CALENDAR**

A. **Approve the June 13, 2022 Public Safety Committee Meeting Minutes**

P5

B. **Approve the August 8, 2022 Public Safety Committee Special Meeting Minutes**

P10

8. **DISCUSSION/ ACTION**

A. **Presentation: Research-based Community Policing in Palm Springs**
– Palm Springs Police Chief Andrew Mills

P12

Recommendation: Information

B. **Public Safety Concerns Related to Mylar Balloons – Erica Felci**

P13

Recommendation: Provide direction on pursuing a model ordinance that limits the sale and/or possession of Mylar balloons in order to address power outages in the Coachella Valley

- C. **Election of Public Safety Committee Officers – Erica Felci** **P18**

Recommendation: Elect a Chair and Vice Chair for the Public Safety Committee for Fiscal Year 2022/2023

9. **INFORMATION**

- A. **Attendance Record** **P20**
- B. **Feedback from Members on the Continued Use of Virtual Meetings** **P21**
- C. **Additional Information on Coachella Valley’s Response and Readiness to Active Shooter Situations** **P23**

10. **PUBLIC COMMENTS ON NON-AGENDA ITEMS**

This is the time and place for members of the public to address the Public Safety Committee on items of general interest within the purview of this committee. Please limit comments to two (2) minutes.

11. **ANNOUNCEMENTS**

Upcoming Meetings:

The next meeting of the **Public Safety Committee** will be held on Monday, November 14, 2022, at 9:00 a.m. via Zoom webinar.

The next meeting of the **Executive Committee** will be held on Monday, September 26, 2022, at 4:30 p.m. via Zoom webinar.

12. **ADJOURNMENT**

Item 2A

Coachella Valley Association of Governments
Public Safety Committee
Member Roster
2022-2023



Voting Members	
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians	Councilmember John Preckwinkle III
City of Blythe	Councilmember Johnny Rodriguez
City of Cathedral City	Councilmember Raymond Gregory
City of Coachella	Councilmember Megan Beaman-Jacinto – VICE CHAIR
City of Desert Hot Springs	Councilmember Roger Nuñez
City of Indian Wells	Councilmember Greg Sanders
City of Indio	Mayor Waymond Fermon - CHAIR
City of La Quinta	Councilmember John Pena
City of Palm Desert	Councilmember Karina Quintanilla
City of Palm Springs	Mayor Pro Tem Grace Garner
City of Rancho Mirage	Councilmember Iris Smotrich
County of Riverside	Supervisor V. Manuel Perez
Ex-Officio Members	
Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians	Robert Bradbury, Emergency Services Manager
California Highway Patrol	Dennis Woodbury, Commander
Cathedral City Fire	John Muhr, Fire Chief
Cathedral City Police	George Crum, Chief of Police
Desert Hot Springs Police	Jim Henson, Chief of Police
District Attorney's Office	Michael Hestrin, District Attorney
Indio Police	Mike Washburn, Chief of Police
Palm Desert Sheriff Station	Dean Agnoletto, Captain
Palm Springs Fire	Vacant
Palm Springs Police	Andrew Mills, Chief of Police
Riverside County Fire Department	Robert Fish, Deputy Chief
Riverside County Probation Department	Ron Miller, Chief Probation Officer
Riverside County Sheriff's Department	Sheriff Chad Bianco
Thermal Sheriff Station	Michael Bianco, Captain
U.S. Border Patrol	David Kim

ITEM 7A

Public Safety Committee Meeting Minutes June 13, 2022



The audio file for this meeting can be found at: <http://www.cvag.org/audio.htm>

1. **CALL TO ORDER** - The meeting was called to order by Chair Waymond Fermon, City of Indio, at 9:02 a.m. via Zoom videoconference, pursuant to AB 361 and the guidelines for virtual meetings.
2. **ROLL CALL** - Roll call was taken and it was determined that a quorum was present.

Members Present

Aqua Caliente Band of
Cahuilla Indians
City of Cathedral City
City of Desert Hot Springs
City of Indio
City of La Quinta
City of Palm Springs
City of Rancho Mirage
City of Coachella
City of Palm Desert
County of Riverside

John Preckwinkle III

Councilmember Raymond Gregory
Councilmember Roger Nuñez
Mayor Waymond Fermon, Chair
Councilmember John Peña
Mayor Pro Tem Grace Garner
Councilmember Iris Smotrich
Councilmember Megan Beaman-Jacinto, Vice Chair
Councilmember Karina Quintanilla
Pat Cooper, Deputy Chief of Staff *(Arrived during Item 3)*

Ex-Officio Members Present

Agua Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians
Cathedral City Fire
Cathedral City Police
Desert Hot Springs Police
City of Indio Police
Palm Desert Sheriff's Substation
City of Palm Springs Fire
Riverside County Probation
Riverside County Sheriff
California Highway Patrol
Thermal Sheriff Station

Robert Bradbury, Emergency Services Manager
Chief John Muhr
Chief George Crum
Chief Jim Henson
Chief Mike Washburn
Captain Dean Agnoletto
Chief J. Kevin Nalder
Cristina Castro
Lt. David Wright
Commander Dennis Woodbury
Captain Michael Bianco

Members & Ex-Officios Not Present

City of Blythe
City of Indian Wells
City of Desert Hot Springs
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol
City of Palm Springs Police
Riverside County Sheriff's Dept.
District Attorney's Office
Riverside County Fire

Councilmember Johnny Rodriguez
Councilmember Greg Sanders
Councilmember Roger Nuñez
Assistant Chief Patrol Agent David Kim
Chief Andrew Mills
Sheriff Chad Bianco
Michael Hestrin
Deputy Chief Robert Fish

3. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

Mayor Fermon led the Public Safety Committee in the Pledge of Allegiance.

4. PUBLIC COMMENTS ON AGENDA ITEMS

None.

5. CHAIR / COMMITTEE MEMBER/CVAG STAFF COMMENTS

Mayor Fermon asked for a moment of silence and announced the names of the five Marines who were killed in a military plane crash on June 8, 2022.

Mayor Pro Tem Grace Garner commented on the recent March For Our Lives rally against gun violence, which was held in Palm Springs on June 11th.

Councilmember John Peña announced a presentation that will be provided to the City Council of La Quinta on gun safety and suggested a presentation be given at a future Public Safety Committee meeting.

Councilmember Karina Quintanilla provided additional information on the March For Our Lives rally that she attended and recognized Mayor Pro Tem Garner and her mother for their contributions to the event and thanked staff and Committee members for the added amended wording for the May 9, 2022 meeting minutes.

Councilmember Iris Smotrich provided her thoughts on the lack of security officers on campus in the Palm Springs Unified School District. In response to Councilmember Smotrich's comments, Councilmember Quintanilla provided an alternative view to having armed officers on school campuses.

Mayor Waymond Fermon requested a presentation on gun violence and preparedness be brought back to the committee in the near future.

Pat Cooper, Riverside County Deputy Chief of Staff, announced that the County budget hearings were taking place today starting at 9:30 a.m.

A. Groundbreaking of Indio's Public Safety Campus

Mayor Fermon gave a presentation on the new Indio Public Safety Campus.

6. EX-OFFICIO COMMENTS

Chief Washburn shared his thoughts on the need for the new public safety campus and indicated that Desert Sands Unified School District does contract with Riverside County Sheriff's department for school campus security.

7. CONSENT CALENDAR

IT WAS MOVED BY COUNCILMEMBER PENA AND SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER RAYMOND TO APPROVE ITEM 7A WITH THE ADDITIONAL LANGUAGE INDICATING COUNCILMEMBER QUINTANILLA REQUESTED STAFF EXPLORE AN ORDINANCE TO LIMIT OR PROHIBIT THE SALE OF MYLAR BALLOONS

A. Approve the May 9, 2022 Public Safety Committee Minutes

THE MOTION CARRIED WITH 9 AYES AND 3 MEMBERS ABSENT

Councilmember John Preckwinkle	AYE
Councilmember Johnny Rodriguez	ABSENT
Councilmember Raymond Gregory	AYE
Councilmember Megan Beaman Jacinto	AYE
Councilmember Roger Nuñez	ABSENT
Councilmember Greg Sanders	ABSENT
Mayor Waymond Fermon	AYE
Councilmember John Peña	AYE
Councilmember Karina Quintanilla	AYE
Mayor Pro Tem Grace Garner	AYE
Councilmember Iris Smotrich	AYE
Deputy Chief of Staff Pat Cooper	AYE

8. DISCUSSION / ACTION

A. CVAG Representative on Riverside County's Emergency Medical Care Committee – Erica Felci

Ms. Felci provided the staff report.

IT WAS MOVED BY COUNCILMEMBER PENA AND SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER RAYMOND TO NOMINATE COACHELLA CITY MANAGER GABRIEL MARTIN TO SERVE AS CVAG'S REPRESENTATIVE ON RIVERSIDE COUNTY'S EMERGENCY MEDICAL CARE COMMITTEE FOR A THREE-YEAR TERM THAT ENDS ON JUNE 30, 2025

THE MOTION CARRIED WITH 9 AYES AND 3 MEMBERS ABSENT

Councilmember John Preckwinkle	AYE
Councilmember Johnny Rodriguez	ABSENT
Councilmember Raymond Gregory	AYE
Councilmember Megan Beaman Jacinto	AYE
Councilmember Roger Nuñez	ABSENT
Councilmember Greg Sanders	ABSENT
Mayor Waymond Fermon	AYE
Councilmember John Peña	AYE
Councilmember Karina Quintanilla	AYE
Mayor Pro Tem Grace Garner	AYE
Councilmember Iris Smotrich	AYE
Deputy Chief of Staff Pat Cooper	AYE

B. Public Safety Concerns Related to Mylar Balloons – Erica Felci

Ms. Felci introduced Antonio Ortega from Imperial Irrigation District (IID) who provided a detailed presentation on the public safety dangers that Mylar balloons cause with power lines.

A robust discussion ensued, with members requesting IID and Southern California Edison conduct a public awareness campaign on the safety concerns caused by these balloons and discussion of state legislation.

IT WAS MOVED BY COUNCILMEMBER GREGORY AND SECONDED BY COUNCILMEMBER SMOTRICH TO RECOMMEND TO THE CVAG EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE THAT CVAG SUBMIT OF A LETTER OF SUPPORT FOR ASSEMBLY BILL 847 REGARDING ELECTRICALLY CONDUCTIVE BALLOONS

THE MOTION CARRIED WITH 9 AYES AND 3 MEMBERS ABSENT

Councilmember John Preckwinkle	AYE
Councilmember Johnny Rodriguez	ABSENT
Councilmember Raymond Gregory	AYE
Councilmember Megan Beaman Jacinto	AYE
Councilmember Roger Nuñez	ABSENT
Councilmember Greg Sanders	ABSENT
Mayor Waymond Fermon	AYE
Councilmember John Peña	AYE
Councilmember Karina Quintanilla	AYE
Mayor Pro Tem Grace Garner	AYE
Councilmember Iris Smotrich	AYE
Deputy Chief of Staff Pat Cooper	AYE

- C. Riverside County's Coordinated Response to Asylum Seekers** – Bruce Barton, Director of Riverside County's Emergency Management Department

Mr. Barton provided an update on the County's plans and coordinated services provided to asylum seekers.

9. INFORMATION – The following items were provided for information only:

- A. Attendance Record**

10. PUBLIC COMMENTS ON NON-AGENDA ITEMS

None.

11. ANNOUNCEMENTS – Upcoming Meetings:

Upcoming Meetings:

The next meeting of the **Public Safety Committee** will be held on Monday, September 12, 2022, at 9 a.m. via Zoom webinar.

The next meeting of the **Executive Committee** will be held on Monday, June 27, 2022, at 4:30 p.m. via Zoom webinar.

The next meeting of the **General Assembly** will be held on Monday, June 27, 2022, at 6 p.m. via Zoom webinar.

12. ADJOURN

Chair Fermon adjourned the meeting at 10:10 a.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Jennifer Nelson
Executive Assistant/Clerk

ITEM 7B

Public Safety Committee Special Meeting Minutes August 8, 2022



The audio file for this meeting can be found at: <http://www.cvag.org/audio.htm>

1. **CALL TO ORDER** - The special meeting was called to order by Chair Waymond Fermon, City of Indio, at 9:03 a.m. via Zoom videoconference, pursuant to AB 361 and the guidelines for virtual meetings.
2. **ROLL CALL** - Roll call was taken and it was determined that a quorum was present.

Members Present

Aqua Caliente Band of	Councilmember John Preckwinkle III
Cahuilla Indians	Councilmember Raymond Gregory
City of Cathedral City	Councilmember Roger Nuñez
City of Desert Hot Springs	Councilmember Greg Sanders <i>(Arrived during Item 5 via phone)</i>
City of Indian Wells	Mayor Waymond Fermon, Chair
City of Indio	Councilmember John Peña
City of La Quinta	Councilmember Iris Smotrich
City of Rancho Mirage	Councilmember Karina Quintanilla
City of Palm Desert	Juan Perez, Chief Operating Officer
County of Riverside	

Ex-Officio Members Present

Aqua Caliente Band of	Robert Bradbury, Emergency Services Manager
Cahuilla Indians	Chief John Muhr
Cathedral City Fire	Chief Mike Washburn
City of Indio Police	Captain Dean Agnoletto
Palm Desert Sheriff's Substation	Chief J. Kevin Nalder
City of Palm Springs Fire	George Crum, Chief of Police
City of Cathedral City Police	Chief Andrew Mills
City of Palm Springs Police	Cristina Castro
Riverside County Probation	Lt. David Wright
Riverside County Sheriff	Commander Dennis Woodbury
California Highway Patrol	

Members & Ex-Officios Not Present

City of Blythe	Councilmember Johnny Rodriguez
City of Coachella	Councilmember Megan Beaman-Jacinto, Vice Chair
City of Palm Springs	Mayor Pro Tem Grace Garner
City of Desert Hot Springs Police	Chief Jim Henson
City of Palm Springs Fire	Chief J. Kevin Nadler
Thermal Sheriff Station	Captain Michael Bianco
U.S. Customs and Border Patrol	Assistant Chief Patrol Agent David Kim
Riverside County Sheriff's Dept.	Sheriff Chad Bianco
Riverside County Fire	Deputy Chief Robert Fish

3. PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE

Councilmember John Peña, City of La Quinta, led the Public Safety Committee in the Pledge of Allegiance.

4. PUBLIC COMMENTS ON AGENDA ITEMS

None.

5. DISCUSSION/ACTION

A. Roundtable Discussion on Coachella Valley's Response and Readiness to Active Shooter Situations at Schools and Other Soft Targets – Erica Felci

A presentation on response and readiness to active shooter situations was given by representatives from various agencies. They included the following speakers: The roundtable will feature the following speakers: Indio Police Chief Mike Washburn; Cathedral City Police Chief George Crum; Palm Springs Unified School District's Executive Director of Security and Disaster Preparedness Levaughn Smart; Desert Sands Unified School District's Director of Safety and Security Edward Nacua; Coachella Valley Unified School District's Director of Safety and Security Gus Paiz; and Riverside University Health System-Behavioral Health's Desert Region Adult Services Administrator Jim Grisham.

A robust discussion ensued with members requesting additional information on available resources to share with their individual organizations and constituents.

No action was taken as this was a discussion item.

6. ANNOUNCEMENTS – Upcoming Meetings:

Upcoming Meetings:

The next meeting of the **Public Safety Committee** will be held on Monday, September 12, 2022, at 9 a.m. via Zoom webinar.

The next meeting of the **Executive Committee** will be held on Monday, September 26, 2022, at 4:30 p.m. via Zoom webinar.

7. ADJOURN

Chair Fermon adjourned the meeting at 10:25 a.m.

Respectfully submitted,

Jennifer Nelson
Executive Assistant/Clerk

ITEM 8A

Coachella Valley Association of Governments Public Safety Committee September 12, 2022



STAFF REPORT

Subject: Presentation: Research-based Community Policing in Palm Springs

Contact: Erica Felci, Assistant Executive Director (efelci@cvag.org)

Recommendation: Information

Background: In November 2021, the City of Palm Springs named Andrew Mills as the new Chief of Police. Chief Mills – who previously was chief of both the Santa Cruz and Eureka police departments – announced early on that he would implementing a research-based, community policing strategy in the Palm Springs Police Department. Nearly one year into his tenure, Chief Mills will provide an update to the CVAG Public Safety Committee about the strategy, how it is working and how the City's residents are responding to the approach.

According to the City's website, "community policing" is a partnership between the Police Department and the residents of Palm Springs to address crime and solve neighborhood problems. The approach has a strong focus on neighborhood involvement, including encouraging active citizen involvement in policing efforts, as well as communicating with the community. The approach varies across Palm Springs, as the police department uses geographically-based crime prevention efforts to identify problems, prioritize concerns, and develop solutions. This includes analyzing data at the at the block level, neighborhood level and at the city level. Additional information about the City's approach can be found here: <https://www.palmspringsca.gov/government/departments/police/community-policing>

Fiscal Analysis: There is no cost to CVAG for this presentation.

ITEM 8B

**Coachella Valley Association of Governments
Public Safety Committee
September 12, 2022**



STAFF REPORT

Subject: **Public Safety Concerns Related to Mylar Balloons**

Contact: Erica Felci, Assistant Executive Director (efelci@cvag.org)

Recommendation: Provide direction on pursuing a model ordinance that limits the sale and/or possession of Mylar balloons in order to address power outages in the Coachella Valley

Background: At its June 2022 meeting, the Public Safety Committee was provided an update on the increasing public safety concerns as it relates to Mylar balloons and power outages. The issue, which has drawn attention from both Southern California Edison (SCE) and Imperial Irrigation District (IID), involves conversations around limiting the sale or possession of Mylar balloons.

Mylar balloons are made with Mylar nylon, a non-biodegradable material, and are typically coated with a metallic finish that conducts electricity. These balloons are a common feature at celebratory events such as birthdays or graduations, and they stay inflated for two weeks or longer. When they are not sufficiently weighted and are released into the air, Mylar balloons have the potential to contact power lines, which can result in power outages and fires. In the first couple months of 2022 alone, IID reported five outages caused by these balloons, impacting 1,672 customers. IID notes that the outages also result in a loss of power to customer medical devices and equipment, can cause damage to IID's and customers' equipment, and cause fire risks.

Since 1990, California has prohibited the release of Mylar balloons into the air in an effort to help reduce power outages. Additional legislative efforts have sought to limit the manufacture or sale of celebratory foil balloons. In June 2022, based on the direction and recommendation of the Public Safety Committee, the CVAG Executive Committee issued support for Assembly Bill 847, authored by Assemblymember Bill Quirk (D-Hayward). AB 847 aims to impose additional regulations to govern the manufacture or sale of celebratory foil balloons, including requiring the manufacturer to permanently mark each balloon with a statement warning the consumer of either the dangers balloons can cause overhead powerlines or requirements for proper disposal. The bill also requires balloons to pass a standard by the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, which is testing balloons at electric distribution voltages without causing an electrical fault.

AB 847 passed out of the Legislature before the legislative session ended in August, and is awaiting signature by the Governor. However, the bill was amended since CVAG's committees endorsed it. Whereas the bill initially aimed to ban the sale of Mylar balloons in 2026 if they cannot pass the standards and requirements, the final version has a much longer phase-out that will start no sooner than January 2027 and could extend past 2031.

Given this, CVAG staff is seeking feedback on whether to pursue a model ordinance that would follow the lead of other California municipalities that have enacted bans to limit the use of Mylar balloons, including limits on the sale or prohibiting them in public parks. As noted in June 2022, IID staff has

drafted a conceptual model ordinance that provides options for bans on limits and possession. Based on the committee's interest, staff would work with IID and SCE representatives to finalize the language and return with proposed language.

Fiscal Analysis: There is no cost to CVAG for this informational update. The development of a model ordinance can be covered under existing staff time, should the Public Safety Committee endorse a regional approach to addressing Mylar balloons.

Attachment: IID's conceptual model ordinance to limit the use of Mylar balloons

SUGGESTED DRAFT ORDINANCE

**AN ORDINANCE OF THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF _____, CALIFORNIA
AMENDING TITLE ____ OF THE COUNTY CODE, BY ADDING CHAPTER ____ TO
PROHIBIT THE SALE OF MYLAR BALLOONS AND POSSESSION OF SUCH ON PUBLIC PROPERTY**

WHEREAS, metallic balloons, also known as Mylar Balloons, have been acknowledged by the State of California as a health and safety hazard when they come in contact with, or come close to, high voltage power lines; and

WHEREAS, the Imperial Irrigation District ("IID"), the electric utility serving Imperial County and parts of Riverside County, owns and operates high-voltage power lines; and

WHEREAS, it is common knowledge that electricity between two lines can arc when conductive material from Mylar Balloons become entangled or come in contact with or come close to such transmission lines, causing power outages, explosions, downed power lines, and damaged infrastructure; and

WHEREAS, IID Regulation Number 23 makes it unlawful for a person to cause interference with or pose a threat to the reliability of IID's transmission or distribution lines or create a safety hazard to the public by encroaching upon the District's rights-of-way; and

WHEREAS, Mylar Balloon related outages has caused the ratepayers and taxpayers to incur costly repairs and suffer many hours of potentially dangerous outages affecting residents; and

WHEREAS, California state law prohibits the release of Mylar Balloons into the air and requires an object of sufficient weight to be affixed to each balloon at the time of sale or distribution to counter the lift capacity of the balloon, as well as requiring permanent warning notices regarding the conductivity and danger of Mylar Balloons along with the manufacturer's name to be placed on said balloons (See California Penal Code Section 653.1 and California Business and Professions Code Section 22942); and

WHEREAS, while state law implements prohibitions and requirements to mitigate Mylar Balloons from coming into contact with power lines, it is the desire of this County Board of Supervisors to implement additional measures to minimize the existence of threats to the health and safety of residents of the County caused by Mylar Balloons.

NOW THEREFORE, BE IT ORDAINED BY THE BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF THE COUNTY OF ____:

SECTION 1. The above Recitals are true and correct.

SECTION 2. Chapter ____ is hereby added to Title ____ of the Imperial County Code, to read as follows:

CHAPTER ____

MYLAR BALLOONS

Sections:

- _____ Purpose and Findings
- _____ Definitions
- _____ Mylar Balloons-Sale Prohibition
- _____ Mylar Balloons-Prohibition of Possession on County Property
- _____ Violation and Penalties
- _____ Severability
- _____ Effective Date

_____ **Purpose and Findings.** In enacting this Chapter, it is the purpose and intent of the Board of Supervisors to further the current state law prohibitions and local regulations relating to the sale and possession of Mylar Balloons and to protect the County's residents and local electric infrastructure from damages caused by Mylar Balloons coming into contact with or close to high voltage power lines.

_____ **Definitions.** The following definitions shall apply to the provisions of this Chapter;

"County" shall mean the County of _____.

"Mylar Balloon" shall mean metallic balloons made of electrically conductive materials filled with helium or a gas which is lighter than air.

"Sell" shall mean to transfer ownership, offer for sale, expose or display for sale, solicit offers to sell or trade for the exchange of money or valuables.

_____ **Mylar Balloons - Sale Prohibited.**

A. The sale of Mylar Balloons, with the exception of the provisions of Subsection C of this Section, whether or not inflated with helium or a gas lighter than air is prohibited.

B. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation or entity to sell or offer to sell any Mylar Balloon whether or not inflated with helium or a gas which is lighter than air.

C. Balloons made of electrically conductive materials that are affixed or mounted to a post or other decorative structure at the point of sale and are filled with air only are exempt from the provisions of this Chapter.

_____ **Mylar Balloons – Possession on County Property Prohibited.** It shall be unlawful to hold, possess, carry, or transport Mylar Balloons, as defined herein, while on property owned or administered by the County of Imperial. This Section shall not apply to hot air balloons or balloons used by governmental entities or for proven scientific or education sanctioned projects

_____ **Violation and Penalties.** Violations of the provisions of this Chapter shall be subject to civil penalties as set forth herein.

Civil Enforcement. The provisions of this Chapter may be enforced through the issuance of administrative citations and the imposition fines in an amount not to exceed FIVE HUNDRED DOLLARS (\$500) per violation.

_____ **Severability.** If any section, subsection, clause or phrase of this Ordinance is declared invalid or otherwise void by a court of competent jurisdiction, it shall not affect the remaining provisions thereof. In this regard, the Board of Supervisors finds and declares that it would have adopted this measure notwithstanding any partial validity thereof.

_____ **Effective Date.** This Ordinance shall take effect and shall be in full force THIRTY (30) Days from the date of its adoption.

Passed by the Board of Supervisors of the County of Imperial on the ____ day of ____, 2021.

Chairman of the Board

ATTEST:

County Clerk

ITEM 8C

**Coachella Valley Association of Governments
Public Safety Committee
September 12, 2022**



STAFF REPORT

Subject: Election of Public Safety Committee Officers

Contact: Erica Felci, Assistant Executive Director (efelci@cvag.org)

Recommendation: Elect a Chair and Vice Chair for the Public Safety Committee for Fiscal Year 2022/2023

Background: Each fiscal year, the Public Safety Committee considers the election of a Chair and Vice Chair. The Committee does not have a formal officer rotation, or a set policy for how to select the Chair and Vice Chair.

A list of the officers for this Committee, dating back to 2010, is attached for member information. The current Chair is Indio Mayor Waymond Fermon, and the Vice Chair is Coachella Councilmember Megan Beaman-Jacinto.

Staff recommends that the Public Safety Committee provide nominations and elect its officers for this fiscal year.

Fiscal Analysis: There is no additional cost to the budget as Public Safety Committee officers receive the same per diem as other committee members.

Attachment: History of Chair and Vice Chair

**PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE
CHAIR AND VICE CHAIR HISTORY**



	<u>Chair</u>	<u>Vice Chair</u>
2021/2022	Waymond Fermon	Megan Beaman-Jacinto
2020/2021	Waymond Fermon	Megan Beaman-Jacinto
2019/2020	John Peña	Waymond Fermon
2018/2019	Russell Betts	John Peña
2017/2018	Betty Sanchez	Russell Betts
2016/2017	Betty Sanchez	Russell Betts
2015/2016	Iris Smotrich	Betty Sanchez
2014/2015	Paul Lewin	Iris Smotrich
2013/2014	Paul Lewin	Iris Smotrich
2012/2013	Terry Henderson	Paul Lewin
2011/2012	Mary T. Roche	Terry Henderson
2010/2011	Lee Weigel	Mary T. Roche
2009/2010	Gene Gilbert	Lee Weigel

Item 9A

COACHELLA VALLEY ASSOCIATION OF GOVERNMENTS
PUBLIC SAFETY COMMITTEE
ATTENDANCE RECORD
FY2021-2022

Voting Members	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	ATTENDED		
Aqua Caliente			●		○		●				○	●	3	out of	5
City of Blythe			●		●		●				●	○	4	out of	5
Cabazon Band - Vacant			*		*		*				*	*	0	out of	5
City of Cathedral City			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
City of Coachella			●		●		○				●	●	4	out of	5
City of Desert Hot Springs			●		○		●				●	○	3	out of	5
City of Indian Wells			●		●		●				○	○	3	out of	5
City of Indio			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
City of La Quinta			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
City of Palm Desert			●		●		○				●	●	4	out of	5
City of Palm Springs			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
City of Rancho Mirage			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
Riverside County			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
Total Attendance Per Meeting			12		10		10				10	9			

Ex Officio / Non-Voting Members	JUL	AUG	SEP	OCT	NOV	DEC	JAN	FEB	MAR	APR	MAY	JUN	ATTENDED		
Agua Caliente			●		○		●				●	●	4	out of	5
California Highway Patrol			●		●		○				●	●	4	out of	5
Cathedral City Fire			○		○		●				●	●	3	out of	5
Cathedral City Police			○		○		○				●	●	2	out of	5
County Probation Department			○		○		●				●	●	3	out of	5
Desert Hot Springs Police			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
District Attorney's Office			○		●		○				●	○	2	out of	5
Indio Police			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
Palm Desert Sheriff Station			○		○		●				●	●	3	out of	5
Palm Springs Fire			●		●		●				●	●	5	out of	5
Palm Springs Police			●		●		●				○	○	3	out of	5
Riverside County Fire			●		●		●				●	○	4	out of	5
Riverside County Sheriff			○		●		●				○	●	3	out of	5
Thermal Sheriff Station			○		○		●				○	●	2	out of	5
U.S. Border Patrol			○		○		○				○	○	0	out of	5
Total Attendance Per Meeting			7		8		11				11	11			

No Meeting

Vacant *

Present ●

Absent ○

ITEM 9B

**Coachella Valley Association of Governments
Public Safety Committee
September 12, 2022**



STAFF REPORT

Subject: **Feedback from Members on the Continued Use of Virtual Meetings**

Contact: Erica Felci, Assistant Executive Director (efelci@cvag.org)

Recommendation: Information

Background: All meetings of CVAG's standing committees are subject to the Ralph M. Brown Act (Gov. Code §§ 54950 *et seq.*), and must be open and public so that any member of the public may attend and participate in the meetings.

Starting in March 2020, CVAG, along with many of its member jurisdictions, began having committee meetings via video/ teleconferencing in place of in-person meetings due to the COVID-19 pandemic. This has proven to be an efficient way to conduct business for CVAG and its sister agencies – the Coachella Valley Conservation Commission (CVCC) and Desert Community Energy (DCE) – which collectively cover an expansive geographic area across eastern Riverside County. Meetings have been well attended, leading to thoughtful and robust conversations on policies, projects and programs. The use of both videoconference and telephone access has also fostered public engagement, as people can join the meetings from a convenient location instead of driving to CVAG's Palm Desert conference room.

In May and June 2021, CVAG staff provided information to its committees that it would be seeking feedback from members on meeting formats that could be implemented this fiscal year, including exploring the options of continuing with at least some form of videoconferencing. The 2021 survey of CVAG's members found overwhelming support for continuing with virtual meetings. In September 2021, the CVAG Executive Committee authorized the Chair and/or the Executive Director to advocate for Brown Act changes that would allow regional agencies such as CVAG to continue utilizing virtual meetings. With the passage of Assembly Bill 361, CVAG, CVCC and DCE have also made findings that support the continued use of virtual meetings.

Over the summer 2022, CVAG staff circulated another survey to elected officials to gauge the interest in continued use of virtual meetings. The survey was simplified for members' ease, and designed for staff to identify if there was any particular committee where the members preferred a change. CVAG received responses from 33 elected officials who were asked for insight on the committees on which they serve. A total of 58 responses were recorded for the standing committees, and 50 of them – or more than 86 percent – were for continuing virtual meetings. Only eight of the responses indicated a preference for in-person meetings, which equated to no more than a couple of votes per committee.

The results were more split for the General Assembly, which includes the elected representatives of every member jurisdiction. The General Assembly meets annually, historically on the last Monday in June, to adopt a CVAG's budget as well as elect a Chair and Vice Chair. Of those who replied, 13 preferred virtual meetings and 11 preferred in-person meetings.

Finally, the poll asked elected officials about what meeting format would be most beneficial for their constituents. Of those who responded, 24 respondents – or more than 70 percent – indicated they prefer virtual meetings for their constituents.

Staff would also note that the use of virtual meetings has generally promoted good attendance, and there has not been any meetings rescheduled due to lack of quorum. Virtual meetings have also created less impact to member schedules and made it easier for them to attend during the workday. The public also benefited from virtual meeting attendance, given they didn't have to drive to CVAG's Palm Desert office during their busy day.

Given the feedback, CVAG staff anticipates continued use of Zoom for its meetings and will work with the Chair of the Executive Committee about options for the 2023 General Assembly meeting, which will be a celebration of CVAG's 50th anniversary.

Fiscal Analysis: There are no additional costs to CVAG hosting virtual meetings. Committee members are paid the same stipends as they would in person.

ITEM 9C

Coachella Valley Association of Governments Public Safety Committee September 12, 2022



STAFF REPORT

Subject: Additional Information on Coachella Valley's Response and Readiness to Active Shooter Situations

Contact: Erica Felci, Assistant Executive Director (efelci@cvag.org)

Recommendation: Information

Background: In August 2022, the Public Safety Committee held a roundtable forum about the Coachella Valley's readiness and response plans to an active shooter situation, particularly at soft targets such as schools. The special meeting featured representatives from the Indio and Cathedral City Police Departments, the Coachella Valley's three school districts and from the Riverside University Health System-Behavioral Health's Desert Region. As was noted during the meeting, local law enforcement and schools have long planned for the unthinkable scenario of an active shooter situation. Additional trainings have been held since the May 24 mass shooting at Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, where 19 children and two teachers died in their classrooms.

During the discussion, members of the Public Safety Committee requested additional information on some of the programs being utilized locally as well copies of some reports referenced by the presenters. With this staff report, CVAG staff is providing the requested follow up:

- Both Cathedral City Police Chief George Crum and Indio Police Chief Mike Washburn referenced national statistics. In May 2021, Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) released a 20-year report of active shooter incidents. The report encompasses statistical data of 333 active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2019. The report is attached.
- It was mentioned that local school districts are taking a proactive approach to addressing bullying and other incidents that may lead to an unsafe school environment. The following are links that the school districts use to easily and anonymously report incidents of concern:
 - Palm Springs Unified: <https://app.sprigeo.com/>
 - Desert Sands Unified: <https://www.psstworld.com/report-it>
 - Coachella Valley Unified: <https://app.sprigeo.com/district/coachella-valley-unified-school-district>
- School officials noted that teachers and other school staff were undergoing additional training opportunities. One of those is ALICE training, which stands for alert, lockdown, inform, counter, evacuate. The training program, which is often taught by certified trainers through for-private companies, focuses on preparing for violent incidents and active shooter situations. Program. It is widely regarded as the first program in the country to use option-based, proactive, survival strategies to prepare for active shooter events. The training program has been implemented not just by schools but by governmental agencies, businesses, health care organizations, places of worship and other organizations and associations.

- All three Coachella Valley school districts are also deploying Raptor Technologies, which is an integrated school safety software that allows schools to screen visitors, track volunteers, report on drills and respond to emergencies. As noted in a recent story by KESQ, the program is designed to approve visitors by checking their driver's license before they go onto campus. It also provides staff with access to an emergency panic button and silent alarm on every screen. The KESQ report, which covers additional security steps beyond Raptor, can be seen here: <https://kesq.com/news/2022/08/01/hardening-school-security-i-team-investigates-whats-being-done-to-keep-kids-safe-on-campus/>

CVAG will continue to follow up on these items based on the direction of Public Safety Committee members.

Fiscal Analysis: There is no cost to CVAG for this informational update.

Attachment: FBI's 20-Year Review of Active Shooter Incidents, May 2021



ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS

20-Year Review 2000-2019



ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Introduction

The Investigative Assistance for Violent Crimes Act of 2012, signed into law in January 2013, permits the attorney general (AG), at the request of an appropriate state or local law enforcement official, to provide federal assistance during active shooter incidents and mass killings in public places. The AG delegated this responsibility to the FBI.

In 2013, the FBI began its initial review of active shooter incidents. The FBI defines an “active shooter” as one or more individuals actively engaged in killing or attempting to kill people in a populated area. Implicit in this definition is the shooter’s use of one or more firearms. The “active” aspect of the definition inherently implies the ongoing nature of the incidents, and thus the potential for the response to affect the outcome.

In 2014, the FBI published its first report, *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents Between 2000-2013*, and subsequently published annual and bi-annual reports reflecting its continued research into active shooter incidents based on the FBI’s definition of an active shooter.

Through its initial research, the FBI identified and reported on 305 active shooter incidents occurring in the United States between 2000-2019. It was later determined there were potentially other active shooter incidents fitting the FBI’s active shooter definition that had not previously been identified. FBI personnel researched official federal, state, and local law enforcement records and open sources in an effort to identify all potential active shooter incidents throughout the country.

As a result, the FBI evaluated and identified an additional 28 active shooter incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2019, bringing the total designated active shooter incidents during this time period to 333. The follow-up research identifying the additional 28 incidents is valid as of February 2021. Personnel did not review or re-validate the research data within the original 305 incidents from prior reports, with the exception of ensuring the number of at-large shooters noted at various points in this report were accurate.

The additional 28 incidents’ data and summaries are included at the end of this report. This valuable information is intended to assist law enforcement and the public in developing strategies to stop active shooter threats, prevent acts of violence, and prepare for, respond to, and recover from such incidents.

Advances in research methodology and technology aided in the collection of information, and the FBI was able to aggregate all identified active shooter incidents. Nevertheless, the possibility remains other relevant incidents may not have been captured if the applied search algorithms did not meet the FBI definition of an active shooter incident.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Overview

This report, produced by the FBI's Office of Partner Engagement, encompasses statistical data regarding 333 active shooter incidents in the United States between 2000 and 2019.

Each page focuses on a particular active shooter-related topic and has been designed specifically for law enforcement officers, other first responders, corporations, educators, and the general public. Topics include:

- 20-Year Active Shooter Summary
- Total Active Shooter Incidents Map
- Total Active Shooter Incidents and Locations
 - Businesses Open to Pedestrian Traffic
 - Businesses Closed to Pedestrian Traffic
 - Malls
 - Education Environments
 - Government Property
 - Military Property
 - Health Care Facilities
 - Houses of Worship
 - Open Spaces
 - Residences
- Casualty Breakdown
- Shooter Outcomes
- Shooter Suicides
- Shooters' Weapons
- Additional 28 Active Shooter Incident Summaries

This report is predicated on data previously published in:

- *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States from 2000-2013*
- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2014 and 2015*
- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2016 and 2017*
- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2018*
- *Active Shooter Incidents Topical One-Pagers 2000-2018*
- *Active Shooter Incidents in the United States in 2019*


This report is in the public domain. Authorization to reproduce this report in whole or in part is granted. The accompanying citation is as follows: *Active Shooter Incidents 20-Year Review, 2000-2019*, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

For more information on active shooter incidents, visit [fbi.gov](https://www.fbi.gov) and search "active shooter."

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



20-Year Active Shooter Summary




Incidents: 333 (in 43 states and the District of Columbia). Total casualties: 2,851 (excluding the shooters). 135 incidents met "mass killing" definition (3 or more killings in a single incident). Killed: 1,062 (including 1,023 civilians, 29 law enforcement officers and 10 security guards). Wounded: 1,789 (including 1,703 civilians, 80 law enforcement officers, and 6 security guards). Number of shooters: 345 (16 wore body armor). Shooter gender: 332 male, 13 female. 119 shooters committed suicide (113 male, 6 female). Other shooter outcomes: 67 killed by police, 4 killed by citizens, 150 apprehended by police, 4 at large.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Total Active Shooter Incidents Map



Quick Look:

Between 2000-2019, active shooter incidents occurred in 43 states and the District of Columbia. California (42), Florida (27), Texas (25), and Pennsylvania (21) had the highest number of active shooter incidents. When an incident occurred in two or more states, it was counted only once (in the state where the FBI identified that the public was most at risk).

State	Number of Incidents
California	42
Florida	27
Texas	25
Pennsylvania	21
Ohio	18
Washington	14
Colorado	13
Illinois	11
Nevada	10
New York	10
Wisconsin	10
Virginia	9
Alabama	8
Maryland	8
Missouri	8
New Mexico	8
Tennessee	8
Arizona	7

State	Number of Incidents
Kansas	6
Louisiana	6
North Carolina	6
Oregon	5
Georgia	4
Indiana	4
Kentucky	4
Minnesota	4
Oklahoma	4
South Carolina	4
District of Columbia	3
Idaho	3
Michigan	3
Nebraska	3
New Jersey	3
Arkansas	2
Connecticut	2

State	Number of Incidents
Mississippi	2
Hawaii	1
Iowa	1
Massachusetts	1
North Dakota	1
South Dakota	1
Utah	1
Vermont	1
West Virginia	1
Alaska	0
Delaware	0
Maine	0
Montana	0
New Hampshire	0
Rhode Island	0
Wyoming	0

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS




Total Active Shooter Incidents and Locations

The FBI reviewed active shooter incidents that occurred in the U.S. between 2000 and 2019 and identified 333 incidents involving 345 shooters.

Quick Look:

During an initial review of active shooter incidents, the FBI identified 305 incidents between 2000 and 2019. As explained in the introduction, the FBI later identified 28 additional active shooter incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2019, changing the total from 305 incidents to 333 incidents.



Year	305 Incidents	28 Additional	Totals
2000	1	2	3
2001	6	4	10
2002	4	3	7
2003	11	1	12
2004	4	1	5
2005	9	2	11
2006	10	2	12
2007	14	0	14
2008	8	1	9
2009	19	0	19
2010	26	1	27
2011	10	3	13
2012	21	0	21
2013	17	2	19
2014	20	0	20
2015	20	0	20
2016	20	0	20
2017	30	1	31
2018	27	3	30
2019	28	2	30


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Total Active Shooter Incidents and Locations

Quick Look:

The 333 active shooter incidents are categorized into 12 different location types.¹



Active Shooter Incident Locations: Businesses Open to Pedestrian Traffic (96); Businesses Closed to Pedestrian Traffic (41); Malls (10); Institutes of Higher Education (18); Pre-K-12 Schools (44); Government Properties (21); Military Properties (9); Health Care Facilities (15); Houses of Worship (15); Open Spaces (50); Residences (13); Other Locations (1)²

Key Findings:

Businesses open to pedestrian traffic had the highest number of incidents with 96, followed by open spaces with 50, and schools (Pre-K-12) with 44.

Ten incidents involved multiple shooters, and half of those incidents occurred in businesses open to pedestrian traffic. The other five incidents involving multiple shooters occurred in four different location types: a residence, institutes of higher education, a school (Pre-K-12), and open spaces (neighborhood streets).

In all, 44 of the 333 incidents involved shootings at two or more locations (incidents were categorized by the location where the public was most at risk).

¹ In *A Study of Active Shooter Incidents in the United States Between 2000 and 2013*, the FBI identified 11 locations where the public was most at risk during an incident. These location categories include commercial areas (divided into businesses open to pedestrian traffic, businesses closed to pedestrian traffic, and malls), education environments (divided into schools [pre-kindergarten through 12th grade] and institutions of higher learning), government properties (divided into military and government properties), health care facilities, houses of worship, open spaces, and residences. In 2018, the FBI added a new category, other locations, to capture incidents that occurred in venues not included in the 11 previously identified locations.

² The one Other Locations incident that occurred during this 20-year period is not outlined separately in this report but is reflected in overall totals. The incident was committed by one male who was apprehended by police.


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS




Businesses Open to Pedestrian Traffic

Quick Look:

Ninety-six incidents occurred in business locations open to pedestrian traffic, defined as a commerce location with the primary purpose of making, buying, or selling goods or providing services in exchange for money, and where pedestrian traffic is anticipated daily (i.e., restaurants, bars, theaters, grocery stores, event venues, etc.).



Businesses Open to Pedestrian Traffic Locations: Small Retail (21); Bar (16); Large Retail (15); Office (15); Restaurant (14); Salon (4); Bank (2); Gym (2); Hotel (2); Movie Theater (2); Shipping & Receiving (2); Casino (1)



Businesses Open to Pedestrian Traffic Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (17); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (8); Suicide at another location (8); Killed by police (including 1 off-duty officer) at the scene (17); Killed by police at another location (4); Killed by citizen at the scene (2); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 2 restrained by citizens) (16); Apprehended by police at another location (29); At large (1)


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Businesses Open to Pedestrian Traffic

Key Findings:

- Of the 96 incidents, five involved multiple shooters occurring in a large office building, a retail setting, bars, and a restaurant.
- Shooters committing their attacks at businesses open to pedestrian traffic were more likely to be killed or commit suicide (56) than be apprehended by law enforcement (45).



Incidents: 96. Total casualties: 754. Killed: 329 (including 319 civilians, 9 law enforcement officers, and 1 unarmed security guard). Wounded: 425 (including 417 civilians, 7 law enforcement officers, and 1 unarmed security guard). Number of shooters: 102. Shooter gender: 98 male, 4 female. Shooter ages: Teens (2); 20s (38); 30s (21); 40s (20); 50s (10); 60s (7); 70s (3); Unknown (1).


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
Businesses Closed to Pedestrian Traffic

Quick Look:

Forty-one incidents occurred in business locations closed to pedestrian traffic. These private properties primarily function in commerce without daily pedestrian traffic and include manufacturing centers, distribution centers, warehouses, transportation facilities, office buildings, etc.



Businesses Closed to Pedestrian Traffic Locations: Manufacturing (20); Distribution (7); Warehouse (5); Transportation Facility (4); Office Building (2); Construction (1); Assembly (1); Moving Company (1)




Businesses Closed to Pedestrian Traffic Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (19); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (4); Suicide at another location (6); Killed by police at the scene (5); Killed by police at another location (1); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 2 restrained by citizens) (4); Apprehended by police at another location (2)

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Businesses Closed to Pedestrian Traffic

Key Findings:



Incidents: 41. Total casualties: 236. Killed: 106 civilians. Wounded: 130 (including 119 civilians, 10 law enforcement officers, and 1 unarmed security guard). Number of shooters: 41. Shooter gender: 36 male, 5 female. Shooter ages: Teens (1); 20s (7); 30s (12); 40s (9); 50s (9); 60s (3).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Malls


Quick Look:

Ten incidents occurred in malls, which are commerce locations that typically consist of more than one anchor store and many smaller businesses under a single roof, though they may include some open spaces. Strip malls, which typically provide no indoor open spaces and are often arranged in a single row, are also included within this location type.



Mall Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (5); Killed by police at the scene (1); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 1 restrained by citizens) (2); Apprehended by police at another location (2)

Key Findings:



Incidents: 10. Total casualties: 52. Killed: 25 civilians. Wounded: 27 civilians. Number of shooters: 10. Shooter gender: 10 male, 0 female. Shooter ages: Teens (4); 20s (5); 50s (1).


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
Education Environments

Quick Look:

Sixty-two incidents occurred in public and private educational settings, defined as schools covering pre-kindergarten to 12th grade, institutes of higher education, and school board meetings.



Education Environment Incidents and Casualties by Location: School Board Meeting (2 incidents, 1 wounded, 0 killed); Elementary (6 incidents, 25 wounded, 36 killed); Middle School (8 incidents, 11 wounded, 2 killed); High School (25 incidents, 104 wounded, 60 killed); Pre-K-12 (2 incidents, 13 wounded, 6 killed); Jr./Sr. High School (1 incident, 4 wounded, 0 killed); Higher Education (18 incidents, 82 wounded, 75 killed)




Education Environments Casualties by Year: 2001 (2 killed, 18 wounded); 2002 (6 killed, 3 wounded); 2003 (4 killed, 3 wounded); 2004 (0 killed, 1 wounded); 2005 (10 killed, 8 wounded); 2006 (9 killed, 16 wounded); 2007 (32 killed, 21 wounded); 2008 (7 killed, 16 wounded); 2009 (0 killed, 2 wounded); 2010 (4 killed, 10 wounded); 2011 (1 killed, 1 wounded); 2012 (38 killed, 16 wounded); 2013 (7 killed, 10 wounded); 2014 (6 killed, 13 wounded); 2015 (9 killed, 7 wounded); 2016 (2 killed, 9 wounded); 2017 (8 killed, 19 wounded); 2018 (29 killed, 52 wounded); 2019 (5 killed, 15 wounded)

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS




Education Environments

Education Environments Shooter Outcomes



Education Environments Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (10); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (8); Suicide at another location (2); Killed by police at the scene (3); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 19 restrained by citizens) (36); Apprehended by police at another location (5)

Key Findings:



Incidents: 62. Total casualties: 419. Killed: 179 (including 178 civilians and 1 unarmed security guard). Wounded: 240 (including 237 civilians, 2 law enforcement officers, and 1 unarmed security guard). Number of shooters: 64. Shooter gender: 62 male, 2 female. Shooter ages: Preteens (2); Teens (36); 20s (11); 30s (4); 40s (7); 50s (3); 60s (1).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS




Government Property

Quick Look:

Twenty-one incidents occurred on government property, defined as public property owned by local, state, federal, or tribal government entities, but not including properties for military use.



Government Locations: Courthouse (8); City Hall (4); Airport (3); Library (1); Museum (1); Police Department (1); Postal (1); Public Works (1); Tribal Office (1)




Government Property Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (1); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (1); Killed by citizen at the scene (1); Killed by police at the scene (11); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 2 restrained by citizens) (6); At large (1)

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Government Property

Key Findings:



Incidents: 21. Total casualties: 89. Killed: 48 (including 41 civilians, 4 law enforcement officers (1 by friendly fire), 2 armed security guards, and 1 unarmed security guard). Wounded: 41 (including 30 civilians, 9 law enforcement officers, and 2 unarmed security guards). Number of shooters: 21. Shooter gender: 19 male, 2 female. Shooter ages: Teens (1); 20s (4); 30s (1); 40s (8); 50s (2); 60s (3); 80s (1); Unknown (1).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Military Property


Quick Look:

Nine incidents occurred on public properties owned by the U.S. government and primarily reserved for the use of the U.S. military, including military bases, airfields, seaports, etc.



Military Property Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (1); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (1); Killed by police at the scene (5); Apprehended by police at the scene (2)

Key Findings:



Incidents: 9. Total casualties: 106. Killed: 40 civilians. Wounded: 66 (including 58 civilians and 8 law enforcement officers). Number of shooters: 9. Shooter gender: 9 male, 0 female. Shooter ages: 20s (4); 30s (4); 60s (1).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS




Health Care Facilities

Quick Look:

Fifteen incidents occurred in public or private facilities that provide primary or secondary health services, including hospitals, clinics, urgent care, hospice care, and retirement facilities.



Health Care Facilities Locations: Hospital/Medical Center (6); Veterans Medical Center (2); Behavioral Health (2); Assisted Living/Nursing Home (2); Group Home (1); Planned Parenthood (1); Substance Abuse Recovery Center (1)




Health Care Facilities Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (4); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (3); Killed by police at the scene (1); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 2 restrained by citizens) (5); Apprehended by police at another location (2)

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Health Care Facilities

Key Findings:



Incidents: 15. Total casualties: 62. Killed: 28 (including 25 civilians and 3 law enforcement officers). Wounded: 34 (including 26 civilians, 7 law enforcement officers, and 1 unarmed security guard). Number of shooters: 15. Shooter gender: 15 male, 0 female. Shooter ages: 20s (2); 30s (4); 40s (6); 50s (3).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Houses of Worship


Quick Look:

Fifteen incidents occurred in houses of worship, defined as public or private facilities used for religiously sponsored activities at the time of an incident. This includes commercial properties used as houses of worship.



Houses of Worship Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (3); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (1); Suicide at another location (2); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 3 restrained by citizens) (5); Apprehended by police at another location (3); Killed by a citizen at the scene (1)

Key Findings:



Incidents Total: (15). Casualties Total: (147), Killed: (80), Wounded: (67), including (5) law enforcement officers and (2) armed security guards. Number of Shooters Total: (15). Shooters Gender: Male (15), Female: (0). Shooter Ages: Teens: (1), 20s: (4), 30s: (1), 40s: (4), 50s: (2), 60s: (1), 70s: (2).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Open Spaces


Quick Look:

Fifty incidents occurred in a variety of open spaces, defined as public or private properties openly accessible to the public. Incidents are categorized as occurring in open space if they take place primarily in an open-air location rather than beginning or ending inside a building.



Open Spaces Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene before police arrived (2); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (6); Suicide at another location (4); Killed by police at the scene (12); Killed by police at another location (2); Apprehended by police at the scene (including 2 restrained by citizens) (13); Apprehended by police at another location (11); At large (1)

Key Findings:



Incidents: 50. Total casualties: 895. Killed: 185 (including 171 civilians, 11 law enforcement officers, and 3 unarmed security guards). Wounded: 710 (including 679 civilians and 31 law enforcement officers). Number of shooters: 51. Shooter gender: 51 male, 0 female. Shooter ages: Teens (4); 20s (21); 30s (13); 40s (6); 50s (2); 60s (3); 70s (1); Unknown (1).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Residences


Quick Look:

Thirteen incidents occurred in a variety of public, private, or multi-family places of residence.



Residences Shooter Outcomes: Suicide at the scene after police arrived (2); Suicide at another location (1); Killed by police at the scene (5); Apprehended by police at another location (6); At large (2)

Key Findings:



Incidents: 13. Total casualties: 89. Killed: 41 (including 39 civilians and 2 law enforcement officers). Wounded: 48 (including 47 civilians and 1 law enforcement officer). Number of shooters: 16. Shooter gender: 16 male, 0 female. Shooter ages: Teens (1); 20s (7); 40s (3); 50s (3); Unknown (2).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Casualty Breakdown


Quick Look:

The 333 active shooter incidents resulted in 2,851 casualties between 2000-2019, including 109 law enforcement and 16 security personnel.



Casualty Breakdown: Businesses Open to Pedestrian Traffic (329 killed, 425 wounded); Businesses Closed to Pedestrian Traffic (106 killed, 130 wounded); Malls (25 killed, 27 wounded); Open Space (185 killed, 710 wounded); Education Environments (179 killed, 240 wounded); Government/Military Facilities (88 killed, 107 wounded); Health Care Facilities (28 killed, 34 wounded); Houses of Worship (80 killed, 67 wounded); Residences (41 killed, 48 wounded); Other (1 killed, 1 wounded)

Casualties by Year



See Casualties by Year data table on the following page for more detailed information.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Casualty Breakdown

Casualties by Year Data Table				
Year	Civilians Killed (Including Security Guards)	Civilians Wounded (Including Security Guards)	Law Enforcement Killed	Law Enforcement Wounded
2000	16	2	0	0
2001	26	59	0	0
2002	18	21	0	3
2003	33	22	0	0
2004	17	9	0	0
2005	30	31	0	0
2006	26	27	0	1
2007	68	54	1	3
2008	30	33	3	1
2009	61	75	4	3
2010	37	50	1	3
2011	45	66	0	0
2012	90	111	0	7
2013	50	45	0	7
2014	33	59	3	2
2015	55	70	1	8
2016	74	114	9	17
2017	139	588	4	3
2018	84	133	2	6
2019	101	140	1	16


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS




Shooter Outcomes

Quick Look:

The FBI identified five main shooter outcome categories. Of the 345 active shooters, 186 died by suicide or were killed by police and 150 were apprehended by police. Since 2016, apprehension by law enforcement was the most likely outcome.



Shooter Outcomes: Apprehended by police (150); Committed suicide (119); Killed by police (67); Killed by citizens (4); At large (5)



See Shooter Outcomes by Year data table on the following page.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Shooter Outcomes

Shooter Outcomes by Year Data Table

	Suicide	Apprehended	Killed	At Large
2000	0	3	0	0
2001	4	6	0	0
2002	3	2	2	0
2003	5	6	1	0
2004	2	2	1	0
2005	5	5	0	1
2006	4	8	1	0
2007	9	2	3	0
2008	4	3	2	0
2009	5	13	1	0
2010	12	9	5	1
2011	5	6	3	2
2012	10	8	4	0
2013	6	8	7	0
2014	9	5	7	0
2015	7	7	7	0
2016	2	10	8	0
2017	11	17	3	0
2018	10	13	6	1
2019	6	17	10	0


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Shooter Suicides


Quick Look:

In the 333 active shooter incidents, 119 shooters (113 male and six female) committed suicide, making it the second most common shooter outcome.



Shooter Suicides: Suicide at another location (23); Suicide at the scene after police arrived (34); Suicide at the scene before police arrived (62)

Shooter Suicides by Year



See Shooter Suicides by Year data table on the following page.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS




Shooter Suicides

Shooter Suicides by Year Data Table

	Suicide at the Scene Before Police Arrived	Suicide at Another Location	Suicide at the Scene After Police Arrived
2000	0	0	0
2001	2	1	1
2002	2	1	0
2003	3	2	0
2004	2	0	0
2005	2	1	2
2006	1	0	3
2007	5	0	4
2008	4	0	0
2009	4	0	1
2010	6	3	3
2011	2	2	1
2012	5	3	2
2013	1	2	3
2014	4	1	4
2015	3	1	3
2016	1	0	1
2017	7	2	2
2018	4	3	3
2019	4	1	1

Age of Shooters Who Committed Suicide



Age of Shooters Who Committed Suicide: Preteens (1); Teens (13); 20s (37); 30s (19); 40s (19); 50s (20); 60s (6); 70s (4)


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Female Shooters

Quick Look:

Thirteen of the 345 shooters were female. The majority carried out their attacks in commercial areas (five in businesses closed to the public and four in businesses open to the public). Nine were over the age of 30, and two carried out the shootings with their spouses (at a restaurant and an office building).



Female Shooters Active Shooter Incidents by Location: Business Closed to Pedestrian Traffic (5); Business Open to Pedestrian Traffic (4); Institutes of Higher Education (2); Government Property (2)

Key Findings:

Shooter Outcomes: Six of the female shooters committed suicide, five were apprehended by law enforcement, and two were killed by police.

Connections to Incidents: Seven of the female shooters were current/former employees, one committed the shooting with her spouse at his place of employment, one was a college student, one was at an eviction hearing, one was upset with a business, and two had no apparent connection to the targets.

Weapons: Eleven of the female shooters used handguns to carry out their attacks; one shooter used a handgun and a rifle, and one shooter used a handgun and rifle and deployed explosive devices that failed to detonate.

Gunfire Exchange: Five of the 13 female shooters exchanged gunfire with law enforcement.

Shooter Ages: 20s (4), 30s (3), 40s (5), 50s (1).


ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Shooters' Weapons

Quick Look:

In the 333 active shooter incidents, handguns accounted for 67% of the weapons used, 38% of the 345 shooters had multiple weapons, 5% wore body armor, and 4% had access to or deployed additional devices.



Guns Used by Shooters: Handguns (344); Long guns (114); Shotguns (58)

Key Findings:

Single/Multiple Firearms

Two hundred fourteen shooters carried a single firearm in 205 incidents; 131 shooters carried multiple firearms in 128 incidents.

Additional Devices

Twelve shooters (in 11 incidents) had access to or deployed additional devices (e.g., improvised explosive devices, incendiary devices, smoke grenades, tear gas canisters).

Body Armor

Sixteen shooters wore body armor (five at open spaces, four at business open to pedestrian traffic, three at government properties, two at high schools, and two at institutes of higher education).

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



ADDITIONAL 28 ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS

As explained in the introduction to this report, the FBI evaluated and identified an additional 28 active shooter incidents that occurred between 2000 and 2019, bringing the total designated active shooter incidents during that time to 333 (from the initial 305). Because they are not included in previous reports, the summaries of the additional 28 incidents are listed below.



Commerce



Education



Government



Open Space



Residence



Houses of
Worship



Health Care



Other

McDonald's and Burger King (Commerce)

On March 2, 2000, at approximately 11:15 a.m., an identified male, 39, armed with a handgun, shot and killed a maintenance worker in his apartment building in Wilksburg, Pennsylvania. The shooter walked to a nearby Burger King, where he shot and killed one person, then walked to a McDonald's, where he shot and killed one person and wounded two others. The shooter fled the scene, shot at police, and entered an office building, where he took several hostages. Three people were killed; two were wounded. Following a standoff, the shooter was apprehended by law enforcement at the location.

Multiple Locations in Mount Lebanon, Pennsylvania (Commerce)

On April 28, 2000, at approximately 1:30 p.m., an identified male, 34, armed with a handgun, fatally shot his neighbor in Mount Lebanon, Pennsylvania. He then drove to the neighbor's synagogue, shot out the front windows, and painted two red swastikas on the building. The shooter then drove to a grocery store, where he killed one person and wounded another (who succumbed to complications from his injuries seven years later). The shooter next drove to the Ya Fei Chinese Cuisine restaurant and shot and killed two additional people. After that, he traveled to the C.S. Kim School of Karate, where he fatally shot another person. Six people were killed; no one was wounded. The shooter was subsequently arrested by law enforcement at another location.

Multiple Locations in Nevada County, California (Health Care)

On January 10, 2001, at approximately 11:30 a.m., an identified male, 40, armed with a handgun, walked up to the first-floor reception counter of the Nevada Department of Behavioral Health in Nevada County, California, and fatally shot two people and wounded another. The shooter fled the scene and proceeded to Lyon's Restaurant, where he fatally shot the manager and wounded another employee. Three people were killed; two were wounded. The shooter was subsequently apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

JB's Pub (Commerce)

On April 13, 2001, at approximately 12:40 a.m., an identified male, 42, armed with two shotguns, two handguns, and approximately 200 rounds of ammunition, began shooting at JB's Pub in Elgin, Illinois, where he had been escorted out for harassing patrons and quarreling with employees. Upon removal, the shooter returned to his residence, shaved his head, changed into military fatigues, and returned to the pub armed with guns and ammunition. Two people were killed; 21 were wounded (five from injuries incidental to the shooting). During the attack, the shooter was wrestled to the ground by bar patrons and employees and subsequently apprehended by law enforcement at the location.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



City Market & Bookcliff RV Park (Open Space)

On July 3, 2001, at approximately 11:45 p.m., an identified male, 42, armed with a handgun, killed one person outside the City Market grocery store in Rifle, Colorado. The shooter then walked through the parking lot and shot one person, who died three days later. The subject proceeded to the Bookcliff RV Park, where he killed two people and wounded three others. Four people were killed; three were wounded. The gunman was apprehended by law enforcement at the location.

Multiple Locations in Sacramento, California (Open Space)

On September 9, 2001, at approximately 11:18 p.m., an identified male, 20, armed with a handgun and wearing a bulletproof vest, shot and killed two of his Burns Security co-workers at a city equipment yard in Sacramento, California. The shooter, a suspended security guard, armed with a rifle, killed two more people at a marina, including another co-worker and a marina employee. The shooter went to the home of a former supervisor, killed one person, took one person hostage, and fled in the victim's vehicle. The hostage escaped, and the next day law enforcement located the shooter in his vehicle. During a pursuit, the shooter engaged officers with gunfire, wounding an officer and another person. Five people were killed; two were wounded. The shooter crashed his vehicle and committed suicide. Law enforcement retrieved a handgun, rifle, shotgun, and pipe bombs.

Top Valu Market (Commerce)

On May 31, 2002, at approximately 5:30 p.m., an identified male, 48, armed with two handguns, entered the Top Valu Market in Long Beach, California, shot and killed the clerk and an 8-year-old child, and wounded the child's parents and two others. Two people were killed; four were wounded. The shooter was killed during a shootout with law enforcement at the location.

Conception Abbey (House of Worship)

On June 11, 2002, at approximately 8:20 a.m., an identified male, 71, armed with two rifles, entered the Conception Abbey in Conception, Missouri, where he shot and killed one person as he walked down a hallway. He then wounded two men as he proceeded toward the cafeteria. As the shooter continued through the building, he shot and killed one more person. Two people were killed; two were wounded. The shooter committed suicide at the location.

University of Arizona College of Nursing (Education)

On October 28, 2002, at approximately 8:30 a.m., an identified male, 41, armed with five handguns, entered the second floor of the University of Arizona College of Nursing building in Tucson, Arizona, and killed a professor in her office. The shooter proceeded to the fourth floor, where he entered a classroom and killed two more professors. Three people were killed; no one was wounded. The shooter committed suicide at the location.

Stateline Tavern (Commerce)

On October 24, 2003, at approximately 3:30 p.m., an identified male, 51, armed with a handgun, entered the Stateline Tavern in Oldtown, Idaho. Shortly after a verbal altercation with one of his victims, the shooter began firing the weapon at patrons, including a known acquaintance. Four people were killed; no one was wounded. The shooter fled and committed suicide at another location.

Alrosa Villa Nightclub (Commerce)

On December 8, 2004, at approximately 10:15 p.m., an identified male, 25, armed with a handgun, climbed a barricade at the Alrosa Villa Nightclub in Columbus, Ohio, jumped on stage, and shot a band member. Spectators attempted to subdue the shooter as he continued shooting. Three people were killed; three were wounded. The shooter took a hostage prior to being killed by responding law enforcement at the location.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Multiple Locations in Delaware and Maryland (Open Space)

On April 8, 2005, at approximately 8:10 a.m., an identified male, 22, wearing a bulletproof vest and armed with a handgun, began firing at people outside an apartment complex in Laurel, Delaware, killing one and wounding two before stealing a vehicle and driving into Maryland. In Salisbury, Maryland, the shooter continued to fire at people, vehicles, and homes, killing one during a carjacking and wounding two. Two people were killed; four were wounded. The shooter was apprehended by local law enforcement after a brief foot chase.

Sash Assembly of God (House of Worship)

On August 29, 2005, at approximately 8:20 p.m., an identified male, 54, armed with two handguns, opened fire in the Sash Assembly of God parking lot in Sash, Texas. The shooter, who was not a congregant but was known to church members, had a verbal disagreement with individuals at the church, departed the parking lot, and returned a short time later, opening fire and killing two people. The shooter fled the scene and shot into a vehicle at an intersection, killing two others. Four people were killed; no one was wounded. The shooter fled the scene again, returned home, and committed suicide after a long standoff with law enforcement.

Finninger's Catering Company (Commerce)

On April 19, 2006, at approximately 1:30 p.m., an identified male, 55, armed with a handgun, arrived at his former place of employment, Finninger's Catering Company, in St. Louis, Missouri, and opened fire, killing two and wounding one. Several hours before, the shooter killed his former girlfriend at her apartment. Three people were killed; one was wounded. The shooter committed suicide when confronted by law enforcement in the parking lot at the location.

Duquesne University (Education)

On September 17, 2006, at approximately 2:15 a.m., two identified males, ages 18 and 19, armed with handguns, opened fire at a dance party at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The shooters, who were not students at the university, left the dance after an argument and returned with handguns and began shooting, wounding five. No one was killed; five were wounded. The shooters were apprehended at different locations and dates after investigation by law enforcement.

Black Road Auto (Commerce)

On March 18, 2008, at approximately 4:00 p.m., an identified male, 31, armed with a handgun, opened fire at Black Road Auto in Santa Maria, California. The shooter was the son of one of the victims. Four were killed; no one was wounded. The shooter was apprehended by law enforcement as he attempted to flee the location.

Hasting's Books and Entertainment and Toby's Bar (Commerce)

On April 20, 2010, at approximately 9:25 p.m., an identified male, 22, armed with a shotgun, began shooting inside the café at Hasting's Books and Entertainment in Wichita Falls, Texas, wounding four. The shooter then walked down the street to Toby's Bar, entered and began shooting, killing one employee of the bar. One person was killed; four were wounded. The shooter fled the location, returned home, and committed suicide.

Omega Psi Phi Fraternity House (Residential)

On February 6, 2011, at approximately 2:00 a.m., two identified males, 20 and 22, armed with handguns, opened fire into an off-campus fraternity house during a party near Youngstown State University in Youngstown, Ohio. The attack was the result of a dispute between the shooters and some attendees of the house party. One person was killed; 11 were wounded. Both shooters were later apprehended by law enforcement following an investigation.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Multiple Locations in Wellton and Yuma, Arizona (Commerce)

On June 2, 2011, at approximately 5:00 a.m., an identified male, 73, armed with a handgun, conducted an attack at various locations in Wellton and Yuma, Arizona. The attack began in Wellton, where the shooter wounded one person and killed four others. The shooter then drove to Yuma, where he killed another person in a law office. The shooter targeted his ex-wife, her close friends, and the attorney who represented her in their divorce proceedings. Five people were killed; one person was wounded. The shooter committed suicide at another location.

Multiple Locations in Grand Rapids, Michigan (Open Space)

On July 7, 2011, at approximately 2:30 p.m., an identified male, 34, armed with a handgun, began shooting victims at two homes in Grand Rapids, Michigan, including the residences of the shooter's former girlfriend, her sister, and her daughter, as well as his estranged wife, their daughter, and his wife's parents. The shooter then shot and wounded another person during a road-rage incident. After carjacking a vehicle, the shooter shot and wounded another acquaintance in her car. Seven people were killed; two were wounded. The shooter's vehicle was located by police, and a pursuit and subsequent gunfight ensued, which ended when the shooter crashed the vehicle and took hostages inside a residence. During the standoff with police, the shooter committed suicide inside the residence.

Multiple Locations in Ladera Ranch, Tustin, and Santa Ana, California (Open Space)

On February 19, 2013, at approximately 4:45 a.m., an identified male, 20, armed with a shotgun, began an attack at his residence in Ladera Ranch, California, where he killed a female inside his mother's condominium. The shooter drove to Tustin, California, where he attempted to carjack a vehicle, shooting and wounding the driver. The shooter successfully carjacked another vehicle, parked along the shoulder of Freeway 55, and began shooting at motorists, wounding three. He then drove to Santa Ana, carjacked another vehicle, and killed its owner. The shooter returned to Tustin and killed a pedestrian in a parking lot. A witness attempting to intervene during this incident was shot and wounded and his vehicle stolen. Three people were killed; five were wounded. The shooter committed suicide at the location.

Centennial Hill Bar and Grill (Commerce)

On December 28, 2013, at approximately 1:00 a.m., three identified males, 21, 23, and 25, armed with handguns, fired multiple rounds at a crowd inside the Centennial Bar and Grill in Montgomery, Alabama. The shooting stemmed from an ongoing dispute between one of the suspects and one of the deceased victims. Three people were killed; five were wounded. The three shooters were subsequently apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

Multiple Locations in La Madera, Tres Piedras, and Abiquiu, New Mexico (Commerce)

On June 15, 2017, at 3:30 p.m., an identified male, 21, armed with a handgun, began a five-hour killing spree at multiple locations in La Madera, Tres Piedras, and Abiquiu, New Mexico. The shooter killed three family members in La Madera. In Tres Piedras, the shooter killed one person and stole his vehicle. The shooter then went to Bode's General Store in Abiquiu, where he shot and killed one person. Five people were killed; no one was wounded. After a pursuit, the shooter crashed the vehicle and was apprehended by law enforcement.

North Side Neighborhood in Evansville, Indiana (Open Space)

On May 11, 2018, at approximately 9:30 p.m., an identified male, 51, armed with a rifle and shotgun, began shooting in the North Side neighborhood of Evansville, Indiana. After the first round of gunfire subsided, a man went to check on his neighbors and was shot and killed by the gunman. The shooter opened fire on responding officers. One person was killed; no one was wounded. After a standoff, the shooter was killed by law enforcement at the location.

Virginia Beach Oceanfront (Open Space)

On July 5, 2018, at approximately 12:30 a.m., an identified male, 21, armed with a handgun, opened fire outside of OMG Everything store on Atlantic Avenue in Virginia Beach, Virginia, wounding six people as they were walking in a crowd along the oceanfront. No one was killed; six were wounded. The gunman was later apprehended by law enforcement at another location.

ACTIVE SHOOTER INCIDENTS



Walmart (Commerce)

On August 14, 2018 at approximately 6:06 p.m., an identified male, 30, armed with a handgun, began shooting at a Walmart in Wyncote, Pennsylvania. The shooter stood in the checkout line with an acquaintance, grabbed her gun, walked toward the back of the line, and fired a single round at a person, wounding him. The shooter then ran through the front of the store and fired multiple rounds, wounding four additional people. No one was killed; five were wounded. The attacker and his acquaintance fled the scene in a vehicle and drove to Philadelphia, where they rear-ended an unoccupied police vehicle and fled on foot. Police initiated a foot pursuit, a violent encounter ensued, and the gunman was subsequently apprehended by law enforcement.

Morgan Hill Ford (Commerce)

On June 25, 2019, at approximately 6:00 p.m., an identified male, 60, armed with two handguns, opened fire inside the Morgan Hill Ford dealership in Morgan Hill, California. The shooter was an employee at the dealership and was fired several hours prior to shooting two managers at the dealership. Two people were killed; no one was wounded. The shooter committed suicide at the location prior to law enforcement's arrival.

Tequila KC Bar (Commerce)

On October 6, 2019, at approximately 1:30 a.m., two identified males, 23 and 25, armed with handguns, began shooting inside the Tequila KC Bar in Kansas City, Kansas. The shooters were kicked out of the bar after an altercation with a bar employee and returned with handguns. Four people were killed; five were wounded. The shooters fled the location. The shooters were apprehended by law enforcement at different locations.